STRIDE Threat Mapping
This section maps each major component and data flow in the Sprinklr Live Chat system to the STRIDE threat categories, summarizing key threats and mitigations.
STRIDE Summary Table
| Component / Flow |
S |
T |
R |
I |
D |
E |
Key Mitigations |
| End User Devices |
✔ |
✔ |
|
✔ |
✔ |
|
Secure tokens, HTTPS, user education, session validation |
| Partner Web App |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
CSP, input validation, SDK integrity, RBAC, audit logs, SRI, CORS, domain whitelisting |
| Partner Admin Users |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
MFA, RBAC, audit logs, secure login, session management |
| Sprinklr Live Chat Service |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
TLS, session auth, tenant isolation, logging, quotas |
| LLM Context Service |
✔ |
✔ |
|
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
Upload validation, output monitoring, least privilege, S2S auth |
| Sprinklr Dashboard & Integration |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
Secure coding, strong auth, audit logs, input validation |
| S2S LLM Callback to Partner |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
Mutual TLS, strict validation, rate limiting, signed callbacks |
| SDK Delivery & Supply Chain |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
Signed SDK, SRI, CORS, CSP, dependency audits, domain whitelisting |
Legend:
S = Spoofing, T = Tampering, R = Repudiation, I = Information Disclosure, D = Denial of Service, E = Elevation of Privilege
Detailed STRIDE Threat Mapping
Partner Web App
| STRIDE Category |
Threats |
Mitigations |
| Spoofing |
Session hijacking, fake login pages, token theft |
Secure login, HTTPS, session validation, anti-phishing measures |
| Tampering |
Malicious script injection, DOM manipulation, SDK tampering |
CSP, input validation, SRI, signed SDK, dependency audits |
| Repudiation |
Users denying actions (e.g., chat sent, config changed) |
Audit logs, non-repudiation tokens, user action tracking |
| Information Disclosure |
XSS, leaking chat data, API key exposure, improper CORS |
Output encoding, CORS/CSP hardening, access controls, encryption |
| Denial of Service |
Resource exhaustion, browser DoS, SDK abuse |
Rate limiting, input validation, quotas, SDK throttling |
| Elevation of Privilege |
Privilege escalation via vulnerable SDK or misconfig |
RBAC, least privilege, secure SDK delivery, config validation |
Sprinklr Live Chat Service
| STRIDE Category |
Threats |
Mitigations |
| Spoofing |
Forged session tokens, impersonation of users/partners |
Strong token validation, mTLS, session management |
| Tampering |
Message alteration, unauthorized config changes |
Input validation, config integrity checks, audit logs |
| Repudiation |
Users/partners denying chat actions or config changes |
Audit logs, signed actions, trace IDs |
| Information Disclosure |
Cross-tenant data leakage, log exposure, improper access |
Tenant isolation, access controls, encrypted logs |
| Denial of Service |
Flooding chat service, resource exhaustion |
Rate limiting, quotas, auto-scaling, DoS protection |
| Elevation of Privilege |
Service misconfig, privilege escalation via API |
RBAC, least privilege, config validation |
LLM Context Service
| STRIDE Category |
Threats |
Mitigations |
| Spoofing |
Forged S2S calls, fake partner backends |
mTLS, signed requests, allowlists |
| Tampering |
Malicious uploads, prompt injection, data poisoning |
Upload validation, prompt sanitization, input checks |
| Repudiation |
Denial of LLM actions or S2S calls |
Audit logs, signed requests, traceability |
| Information Disclosure |
LLM leaking sensitive data, improper callback data |
Output filtering, data minimization, access controls |
| Denial of Service |
Malicious uploads, LLM abuse, callback flooding |
Rate limiting, input validation, quotas |
| Elevation of Privilege |
LLM agentic flows invoking unauthorized actions |
Function whitelisting, least privilege, config review |
Sprinklr Dashboard & Integration Backend
| STRIDE Category |
Threats |
Mitigations |
| Spoofing |
Admin impersonation, session hijacking |
MFA, secure login, session validation |
| Tampering |
Unauthorized config changes, API key manipulation |
Audit logs, config integrity, access controls |
| Repudiation |
Denial of admin actions, config changes |
Audit logs, signed actions, traceability |
| Information Disclosure |
API key leakage, config data exposure |
Access controls, encryption, audit logs |
| Denial of Service |
Flooding dashboard APIs, resource exhaustion |
Rate limiting, quotas, monitoring |
| Elevation of Privilege |
Privilege escalation via dashboard bugs |
RBAC, least privilege, secure coding |
S2S LLM Callback to Partner Backend
| STRIDE Category |
Threats |
Mitigations |
| Spoofing |
Fake Sprinklr calls to partner backend |
mTLS, signed requests, allowlists |
| Tampering |
Callback data alteration, replay attacks |
Nonces, input validation, signed requests |
| Repudiation |
Denial of callback actions |
Audit logs, signed requests, traceability |
| Information Disclosure |
Sensitive data leakage in callback |
Data minimization, access controls, encrypted transport |
| Denial of Service |
Callback flooding, resource exhaustion |
Rate limiting, quotas, monitoring |
| Elevation of Privilege |
Callback invoking unauthorized partner actions |
Function whitelisting, least privilege, config review |
SDK Delivery & Supply Chain
| STRIDE Category |
Threats |
Mitigations |
| Spoofing |
Fake SDK delivery, MITM attacks |
HTTPS-only, signed SDK, SRI, domain whitelisting |
| Tampering |
Malicious SDK modification, dependency compromise |
Signed SDK, SRI, dependency audits, version pinning |
| Repudiation |
Denial of SDK delivery or update actions |
Audit logs, signed delivery, traceability |
| Information Disclosure |
SDK leaking data, dependency exfiltration |
Output filtering, access controls, dependency review |
| Denial of Service |
SDK delivery disruption, dependency DoS |
CDN redundancy, monitoring, fallback versions |
| Elevation of Privilege |
SDK or dependency privilege escalation |
Least privilege, secure coding, dependency review |